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Do house prices overreact to relevant information? New evidence from the 
UK housing market.  
                                                                  by  
                   Hanxiong Zhang*, Viktor Manahov, Robert Hudson and Hugh Metcalf  
 
                                                                 Abstract 
We use recent panel data and various empirical models to investigate the validity of the irrational 
expectations hypothesis and the feedback theory in the UK housing market. We provide the first 
empirical evidence to justify the statistically significant and positive feedback causality effect 
between the changes in bubbles and the contemporaneous changes in house prices. While we 
have found evidence to support the idea that the irrational expectation hypothesis best fits the 
UK housing market in the short-run, we failed to find evidence in support of the feedback theory. 
We observe that an increase in bubbles could cause a subsequent decrease in house prices, 
ceteris paribus, suggesting that people also learn from their mistakes and attempt to compromise 
by acting as rationally as possible. Overall, we observe that the causality effects are 
asymmetrical, being more significant from bubble to house price than they are from house price 
to bubble. 
JEL Classification: C13; C23; G02; G10. 
Keywords: Panel Data, Endogeneity, House Price, Bubble, Expectation Hypotheses. 
*Hanxiong Zhang, PhD, The University of Lincoln, United Kingdom, Brayford Pool, Lincoln, 
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1 Introduction 
This paper considers whether the bounded rationality expectation hypothesis best fits the UK 
housing market in terms of panel data analysis. Furthermore, we also look at whether the 
feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007) is supported in the UK housing market. On the one hand, 
the bounded rationality expectation hypothesis captures the idea that house prices, especially 
intrinsic house price bubbles, overreact to relevant information on fundamentals due to people’s 
cognitive and psychological limitations. Black et al., (2006) argue that house price bubbles will 
be more highly correlated with fundamental factors than with prices themselves in terms of 
magnitude, meaning that the dominant driving force is fundamentals rather than peoples’ 
irrational activities. 
On the other hand, the feedback theory proposed by (Shiller, 1990,2007) suggests that when 
house prices as a whole appreciate significantly they generate many investor success stories. 
These stories entice potential investors, who naively extrapolate that they will also achieve the 
same success if they invest. While this process is leading to an increase in house prices, the 
feedback theory implies that the same process could be reversed when house prices decrease. 
The feedback theory appears as a type of irrational expectation hypothesis, which means that 
people usually form their expectations of house prices by looking backward at the past price 
movement rather than fundamentals. Moreover, the theory states that there is a positive feedback 
causal relationship between house price bubbles, which reflect people’s biased expectations, and 
subsequent house prices.  
However, Mayer (2007) argues that Shiller (2007) overstates the case by ignoring the role of 
interest rates and using an outdated dataset. This has led to the introduction of panel data analysis 
for as a tool for investigation of more recent house price behaviour.  
3 
 
There are two broad categories of literature study of house prices using panel data analysis. The 
first category focuses on the linkages between some fundamental factors and housing prices.  
For instance, Holly et al. (2010) investigate the determination of real house prices by using a 
spatio-temporal model in a panel of 49 US states over a period of 29 years. Holly et al. (2011) 
propose a novel way to model the spatial-temporal dispersion of shocks in non-stationary 
systems in a panel of 11 UK regions. Holly et al. (2011) suggest that the effects of a shock decay 
more slowly along the geographical dimension when compared to the decay along the time 
dimension. The second category places emphasis on whether the house prices are supported by 
fundamentals. For example, Cameron et al. (2006) examined the bubbles hypothesis using a 
dynamic panel data model in a panel of the UK regional property prices from 1972 to 2003, but 
failed to find a bubble. Recent studies (0LNKHG DQG =HPþtN ; Clark and Coggin, 2011) 
suggest that there is a house price bubble in the US, according to the univariate and panel unit 
root and co-integration tests.  
Nevertheless, the majority of the studies related to the topic have a major shortcoming. They 
failed to quantify the level of housing price bubbles by using panel data analysis, let alone 
modelling the direction of causality between the changes in house price and the changes in 
bubble.  
In contrast, this paper uses the most recent UK dataset to quantify the regional changes in 
bubbles using a time series approach, namely the user cost framework in a state space model. 
Also, this study provides the first empirical evidence to justify the statistically significant 
feedback causality between the changes in bubbles and the contemporaneous changes in house 
prices by using the Fixed Effects Model (FEM).  
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Relative to the pure aggregate time-series analysis, we implement panel data analysis using the 
regional data, which possesses several advantages such as: (1), panel data normally provides a 
large number of data points, thereby raising the degrees of freedom and eliminating the 
multicollinearity among independent variables; (2), controlling for individual heterogeneity; (3), 
micro panel data collected on individual regions may be more precisely measured than similar 
variables measured at the macro level; (4) better ability to investigate the dynamics of economic 
states; (5) panel allows researchers to investigate causality (Hsiao, 2003; Frees, 2004; 
Wooldridge, 2010). 
To summarise the main contribution of this study is three-fold. First, our findings indicate that 
the changes in the UK house price bubbles best fit the irrational expectation hypothesis in the 
short-run, given that past price movement rather than fundamentals are dominating the UK house 
price bubbles. However, an increase in a bubble could cause a subsequent decrease in house 
prices, ceteris paribus, suggesting that people learn from their mistakes and attempt to 
compromise by acting as rationally as possible. Therefore, there is also weak evidence to support 
the bounded rationality expectation hypothesis. As the paper uses log differenced stationary 
dataset, co-integration is outside the scope of this study and all of the empirical evidences 
characterise by a short-run effect.  
Second, we have found that feedback causality between the changes in bubbles and the 
contemporaneous changes in house prices is robust, even when taking the mortgage rate and the 
more recent datasets into account. Moreover, our empirical findings suggest that the feedback 
theory may not hold. We observe that an increase in bubbles could cause a subsequent decrease 
in house prices, ceteris paribus, suggesting that people also learn from their mistakes and attempt 
to compromise by acting as rationally as possible.  
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Third, we contribute to the literature on how regional heterogeneity may affect a region’s 
housing market. Chi (2005) argues that when some regional heterogeneity is unobservable, a 
fixed effects model helps to capture the effect of the unobservable variables and therefore 
alleviates the endogeneity problem resulting from the omitted variable bias. We observe that the 
causality effects are asymmetrical, being more significant from bubble to house price than the 
effects from house price to bubble in the presence of the observable and unobservable regional 
characteristics. 
The remainder of the paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 presents the 
methodology; Section 3 describes the data in detail; Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical 
results, and the paper concludes in Section 5.  
2 Methodology 
Section 2.1 presents how to estimate the regional changes in bubbles using the user cost 
framework in a state space model, which is a typical time series approach. Section 2.2 exhibits 
the causality tests in the context of the fixed effects model. Throughout this paper, lower case 
letters for time-dependent variables represent the natural logarithm of their capital counterparts. οଵ denotes first difference. 
2.1 Estimation of Changes in Bubble 
Given that asset price is a combination of fundamental, non-fundamental, or bubble and model 
misspecification error (Wu, 1997), we can write the changes in house price as 
οଵ݌݄௧ = οଵ݌݄௧௙ + οଵܾ௧ + ߝ௧                                                                                                        (1) 
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Where, οଵ݌݄௧ is the changes in house price, οଵ݌݄௧௙ is the changes in fundamental house price, 
and οଵܾ௧  is the changes in bubble, ߝ௧  is error term. Because ݈݋݃௘൫ܪܲܫ௧௙൯ = ݈݋݃௘൫ܪܲܫ௧௙/ܪܴܫ௧൯ + ݈݋݃௘ (ܪܴܫ௧), we can rewrite equation (1) as 
οଵ݌݄௧ = οଵ݌݄௧௙ + οଵܾ௧ + ߝ௧ = ൫οଵ݌ݎ௧௙ + οଵ݄ݎ݅௧൯ + οଵܾ௧ + ߝ௧                                                (2) 
οଵ݌ݎ௧௙ = οଵ ݈݋݃௘൫ܪܲܫ௧௙/ܪܴܫ௧൯ is the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio, οଵ݄ݎ݅௧ =οଵ݈݋݃௘ (ܪܴܫ௧) is the changes in house rent index. In equation (2), the changes in fundamental 
house price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௧௙ and the changes in bubble οଵܾ௧ are not directly observable and need 
some algebraic estimation. 
First, we estimate the fundamental house price-rent ratio ݌ݎ௧௙ by using the user cost framework. 
The user cost framework suggests that at the equilibrium house price ܪܲܫ௧௙, the cost of holding a 
house per year ܷܥ௧ × ܪܲܫ௧௙ equals the cost of renting the house ܪܴܫ௧ for that period, namely, 
ܪܴܫ௧ = ܷܥ௧ × ܪܲܫ௧௙                                                                                                                     (3) ܷܥ௧ is the user cost of holding a house per year at the percentage level. Then, the fundamental 
house price-rent ratio ܴܲ௧௙ is the inverse of the user cost ܷܥ௧. 
ܴܲ௧௙ = ு௉ூ೟೑ுோூ೟ = ଵ௎஼೟                                                                                                                         (4) 
At the percentage level: 
ܷܥ௧ = ܴ௧௠ + ܲ ௧ܶ + ܯܥ௧ + ܴ ௧ܲ െܯ ௧ܶ(ܴ௧௠ + ܲ ௧ܶ) െ ܥܩ௧ାଵ                                                     (5) 
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Where, ܴ௧௠ is the foregone mortgage rate, ܲ ௧ܶ is the property tax rate, ܯܥ௧ is the maintenance 
cost, ܴ ௧ܲ is the risk premium for the larger uncertainty of purchasing relative to renting, ܯ ௧ܶ is 
the marginal tax rate for the house buyer. ܥܩ௧ାଵ is the expected capital gain over the next year. 
Equation (4) implies that the user cost should be positive, as neither the theoretical house price 
nor the actual market rent should be negative. We calculate the risk premium ܴ ௧ܲ and expected 
capital gain ܥܩ௧ାଵ as 
ܴ ௧ܲ = ܥܩ௧ାଵ െ ுோூ೟శభିுோூ೟ுோூ೟                                                                                                           (6) 
ܥܩ௧ାଵ = ு௉ூ೟శభு௉ூ೟ െ 1 = ு௉ூ೟శభିு௉ூ೟ு௉ூ೟                                                                                                (7) 
Equation (6) calculates the risk premium as the difference between the house price appreciation 
and the rent appreciation over the next year. Equation (7) calculates the expected capital gain as 
the realized capital gain over the next year. Then, 
ܴ ௧ܲ = ܥܩ௧ାଵ െ ுோூ೟శభିுோூ೟ுோூ೟ = ு௉ூ೟శభିு௉ூ೟ு௉ூ೟ െ ுோூ೟శభିுோூ೟ுோூ೟                                                              (8) 
Equation (8) implies that the net effect of the risk premium and the expected capital gain equals 
the changes in rent over the next year. Due to the fact that we use quarterly data, the expect 
annual changes in rent are the changes in rent over the next four quarters. We estimate the 
maintenance cost and depreciation rate as ܯܥ௧ = 2% (Himmelberg et al., 2005; Girouard et al., 
2006; Finicelli, 2007). We exclude property tax and set ܲ ௧ܶ = 0  for two reasons. Firstly, 
property tax payment is not deductible from income tax under the UK tax system. Secondly, in 
the UK, the tenant rather than the landlord is responsible for paying the property tax. As property 
tax is usually not included in the rent, property tax should also be removed from the user cost.  
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In accordance with the UK Mortgage Interest Relief at Source (MIRAS) scheme, over some 
historic periods, a borrower has paid the lender the interest less the tax relief. The rate of relief 
from 1995-96 to 1997-98 was 15%, and for 1998-99 and 1999-2000 it was 10%. The relief on 
mortgage interest repayments was removed on 6 April 2000. Accordingly, we set the UK 
marginal tax rate ܯ ௧ܶ = 15% from 1996Q2 to 1998Q1, ܯ ௧ܶ = 10% from 1998Q2 to 2000Q1, 
and ܯ ௧ܶ = 0 thereafter. Furthermore, the paper uses the composite mortgage rates from Building 
Societies and Banks over the sample period 1996Q1-2011Q1 to proxy the ܴ௧௠.  
Because the quarterly changes in regional house prices are quite large, a few of the user costs are 
negative. In such cases, the negative user costs are replaced by the previous positive figures. 
As a second step, the paper estimates the changes in bubble οଵܾ௧  by using a state space 
modelling. 
Measurement equation: 
οଵ݌݄௧ = ܿଵοଵ݌ݎ௧௙ + ܿଶοଵ݄ݎ݅௧ + οଵܾ௧ + ܿଷ                                                                                        (9) 
State equation: 
οଵܾ௧ = ܿସοଵܾ௧ିଵ + ܿହ                                                                                                                               (10) 
ܿଷ~݅. ݅.݀.ܰ(0,ܴ)                                                                                                                       (11) 
ܿହ~݅. ݅.݀.ܰ(0,ܸ)                                                                                                                                       (12)  
ܧ(ܿଷ, ܿହᇱ ) = 0,ܧ(ܿଷ,ܾ଴ᇱ ) = 0 and ܧ(ܿହ, ܾ଴ᇱ ) = 0                                                                        (13) 
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ܿଷ and ܿହ are the error terms. ܾ଴ᇱ  is the initial state vector. There are no constants in equation (9) 
and equation (10), given that the expected value of housing will be zero when the fundamental 
value and bubble are both zero. The five unknown parameters ൫ܿଵ, ܿଶ,ߪ௖యଶ , ܿସ,ߪ௖ఱଶ ൯ᇱ are 
hyperparameters and are estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with Marquardt 
algorithm. The rationale for using an AR(1) for the changes in bubble process is based on the 
assumption that people will naively extrapolate the most recent changes in bubble into the next 
period (Wu, 1997). The state space model step simplifies the model building process relative to 
Wu (1997) and Black et al. (2006) while maintaining the advantages of a state space model. 
2.2 Panel Data Causality Tests 
From the perspective of econometrics, there are four possible causal relationships between the 
changes in bubbles and the changes in house price: (1) changes in bubbles drive subsequent 
changes in house price; (2) changes in house price drive subsequent changes in bubbles; (3) 
feedback effect, the changes in house price affects the changes in bubbles, or causality runs both 
ways; (4) changes in bubbles and changes in house price are not directly related, but are 
spuriously associated through other variables which are either observable or unobservable. 
Condition (3) and condition (4) refer to the endogeneity, which is one of the most significant 
challenges in applied econometrics.  
We follow Chi (2005) to determine the following fixed effects models: 
οଵ݌݄௜,௧ = ןଵ+ ߚοଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ + σ ߚ௞ܥ௞,௜,௧ + ݑ௜௄௞ୀଵ + ߝ௜,௧                                                                (14) οଵܾ௜,௧ =  ןଶ+ ߠοଵ݌݄௜,௧ିଵ + σ ߠ௞ܥ௞,௜,௧ + ߤ௜௄௞ୀଵ + ߳௜,௧                                                               (15) 
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Where, οଵ݌݄௜,௧ is the changes in house price index for region ݅ at time ݐ. οଵܾ௜,௧ is the changes in 
bubble for region ݅ at time ݐ. ןଵ and ןଶ are constants. ݅ represents different regions, ݐ represents 
time, and ݇ is the number of Control Variables. For instance, ܥ௞,௜,௧ is the ݇-ݐ݄ control variable 
for region ݅ at time ݐ. ߚ and ߠ are the coefficients on the underlying independent variables. ݑ௜ 
and ߤ௜ are the fixed effects, indicating the effects of any and all time-invariant covariates on each 
variable, along with time-specific error terms ߝ and ߳. The fixed effects model includes all of the 
unobserved effects and then provides a good control for endogeneity (Chi, 2005; Schroeder, 
2010; Wooldridge, 2010). The key motivation of using a fixed effects model is to alleviate the 
omitted variable bias, not because the unobservable regional heterogeneity is fixed over time. 
Furthermore, the fixed effects model controls for the endogeneity by extracting the unobservable 
regional heterogeneities ݑ௜  and ߤ௜  from the error terms ߝ  and ߳  respectively. It is possible to 
estimate equations (14) and (15) simultaneously, such as in the typical panel data Granger 
causality tests (Hoffmann et al., 2005; Schroeder, 2010). However, estimating equations (14) and 
(15) separately allows for more flexibility in specifying the model. 
Frees (2004) and Chi (2005) identify three criteria for inferring causality such as the presence of 
statistically significant relationship; the causal variable must precede the other variable in time; 
the association between two variables must not be resulting from another, omitted, variable. 
Given equations (14) and (15) control for these observable and unobservable regional 
heterogeneity (criterion 2 and criterion 3), one can infer that the causality effect primarily 
depends on the significance of the relevant coefficients. For example, the statistical significance 
of ߚ would indicate changes in bubbles cause subsequent changes in house price, ceteris paribus. 
The statistical significance of ߠ indicates that changes in house price would cause changes in 
bubbles, ceteris paribus. The Random Effects Model (REM) is another popular panel data model. 
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REM assumes the omitted time-invariant variables are irrelevant with the involved time-varying 
covariates. REM is often estimated by the Generalized Least Square (GLS) estimator, while 
FEM is often estimated within the OLS estimator. REM outperforms FEM because of its greater 
efficiency, leading to statistical power to detect effects and smaller standard errors. Given that 
there is almost always some omitted variables bias, FEM appears to be more suitable than REM 
from a causal inference perspective. Both random and fixed effects models have implicit 
restrictions that are infrequently examined but, if incorrect, could bias the estimated results. For 
example, both models assume that the unexplained variance remains the same over time. 
Moreover, the autoregressive relations with lagged dependent variables are assumed to be nil. 
When the lagged dependent variables are included in the Arellano Bond dynamic model, the 
dataset has to be a large number of regions (N) and short time period (T) (Arellano and Bond, 
1991; Bond, 2002). Although the Hausman test is widely used to distinguish between REM and 
FEM, the choice is never straightforward, and it tends to be harder still when the number of 
observations is small (Hsiao, 2003; Bollen and Brand, 2008,2010). 
3 Description of data 
The dataset in this study covers the twelve regions of the UK regional Halifax seasonal adjusted 
House Price Indices (HPI). The UK aggregate House Rent Index (HRI) is proxied by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) component of actual rents for housing, and the composite mortgage 
rate of Building Societies and Banks from the Bank of England. Black et al. (2006) suggest that 
the Halifax house price index tracks price changes of a representative house rather than average 
prices by using the hedonic regression. The price of the representative house is then estimated for 
each period using the implicit prices of each attribute, as extracted from the hedonic regression.  
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We estimate the changes in national house rent index as identical to the changes in regional 
house rent index across the UK, given that the regional house rent index is unavailable. As all the 
variables used in the main regressions are first log differenced and stationary, co-integration and 
long-run equilibrium are beyond the consideration of this paper. Therefore, all of the findings in 
this paper are short-run effect.  
All the quarterly UK time series data are collected from DataStream with a time span from 
1996Q1 to 2011Q4. The start and end dates are chosen by the availability of data for the House 
Rent Index. All of the indices are set to 100 in 2005Q2. The twelve regions of the UK are: 
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and the nine regions of England, namely, East Anglia, East 
Midlands, Greater London, North, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands, and 
Yorkshire and the Humber. The full dataset has long time periods (ܶ = 60 ) with small 
individuals (ܰ = 12) at the first log difference scale. All of the variables in this paper are not 
adjusted for inflation. Given that ‘there is a great deal of confusion about the role of inflation 
expectations in the demand for housing’ (Schwab, 1982), it is interesting to study the linkages 
between house prices and its determinants in nominal terms. Akerlof and Shiller (2010) suggest 
that people often fail to exclude the effect of inflation on their house investments in reality. 
A preliminary statistics and correlation matrix about the changes in HPI, changes in HRI, 
changes in fundamental price-rent ratios and changes in bubbles are available in Appendix Table 
A1 and Table A2, respectively. 
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4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
4.1 Findings from the Full Sample 
Table 1 shows the results of panel data unit root tests for changes in house price index οଵ݌݄௜,௧, 
changes in fundamental house price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙ , changes in house rent index οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ and 
changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧. We implement the Harris–Tzavalis (HT) test, Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) 
test and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test as our applied unit root tests. The dataset includes all twelve 
UK regions over the period 1996Q2 to 2011Q1. As expected, all of these variables are stationary 
at the 1% significance level. 
Figure 1 displays the changes in regional bubbles against the changes in regional house prices. In 
Figure 1, the quarterly changes in bubbles report significant regional heterogeneities with values 
ranging from -8% to 10%, which indicates that the bubbles do not follow the explosive paths. 
Hence, we reject the rational expectation hypothesis proposed by (Diba and Grossman, 1988). 
Apart from a few exceptions such as Northern Ireland, the difference between changes in bubble 
and changes in house price is minute for a given region. The bubbles increase across the UK 
from 1996 to 2007, given that the changes in bubbles  οଵܾ௜,௧ are positive during most of that time. 
During the Subprime Crisis, the bubbles decreased significantly thereafter and demonstrated 
varied recovery after 2009. 
Table 2 shows the impact of changes in bubbles on changes in housing price in terms of the 
Fixed Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effects Model (REM). Model 1 of each approach 
regresses the changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ against the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and the changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧. The coefficients on changes in fundamental price-rent 
ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  are statistically significant with a value of -0.031 in both FEM and REM, so, one 
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percent increases in the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio will significantly cause housing 
return decreases by 0.031 percent, ceteris paribus. The coefficients on changes in rents οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ 
are -0.167, but are insignificant in both FEM and REM. 
Model 2 (Table 2) regresses the changes in house prices οଵ݌݄௜,௧  against the changes in 
fundamental price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙ , the changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧  and the changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧. Model 2 suggests that after controlling for the changes in the fundamental price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and the changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ , the coefficients on the changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧  are 
statistically significant with a value of 1.209 and 1.124 in the FEM and REM, respectively. 
Given that bubble is a component of house price, approximately one percent change in bubbles 
drives one percent changes in house price after controlling for the effect of the fundamental 
variables. In contrast to Model 1, the coefficients on the changes in rents οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ turn positive 
but are still statistically insignificant. 
Relative to Model 2, Model 3 includes the lagged changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ  as another 
independent variable. The coefficients on the changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ remain significant, but 
are more positive in both FEM and REM. The coefficients on the lagged changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ  are significantly negative with a value of -0.434 and -0.484, respectively, which 
indicates that the previous increases in bubbles tends to reduce the subsequent increases in house 
prices, ceteris paribus. Hence, the significant but negative coefficients on the lagged changes in 
bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ  do not support the feedback theory. Given that the bubbles reflect people’s 
biased expectations, the negative coefficients on lagged changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ suggest that 
people learn from their past mistakes and try to adjust the current house prices in order to 
converge to their fundamental values which, in turn, justify the arguments of the bounded 
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rationality expectation hypothesis. The net effect of changes in bubble οଵܾ௜,௧ and lagged changes 
in bubble οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵis approximately one unit, ceteris paribus. Additionally, the coefficients on the 
changes in rents οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ become more positive and statistically significant. 
In Models 4 and 5, the paper adds two interactive variables, οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, 
to control for the interaction effects. οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  is the interaction of changes in bubbles and 
changes in fundamental price-rent ratio. οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ is the interaction of changes in bubble 
and changes in rent. Throughout the paper, all of the interactive variables are scaled down by 
multiplying them by 100. This is because the first log differenced variables, such as οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ and οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙ , represent the continuous compounded returns on the underlying variables. However, the 
interaction variables represent the multiplying effect of return on return. The scaling only affects 
the coefficients of scaled variables, but it does not influence the coefficients of other variables 
and the fit of the model.  
The interaction effect of changes in bubbles and changes in fundamental price-rent ratio οଵܾ௜,௧ כοଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  is significantly positive, with a coefficient of 0.2% in FEM and 0.1% in REM, which 
indicates that the effect of changes in bubbles on the changes in house price is positively 
dependent on the changes in the fundamental price-rent ratio. On the contrary, the coefficient on 
the interaction effect of changes in bubbles and changes in rent οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ is significantly 
negative, with a value of -0.104 in FEM and -0.154 in REM, implying that increasing bubbles 
combined with declining rents make it more attractive to buy than rent because of higher capital 
gain on ownership, ceteris paribus.  
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The coefficients on changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧  and lagged changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ  remain 
significant and on their signs after controlling for the interaction effects. 
Table 2 shows a series of interesting findings. First, the significantly negative coefficients on 
changes in fundamental price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and the significantly positive coefficients on 
changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ jointly indicates that with the changes in house price the changes in the 
fundamental house price are less than the changes in rent, ceteris paribus. On the one hand, 
Britain has probably the most liberalised private renting market in the European Union (EU) 
since 1989. Less security of tenure and the long-term taxation imbalance between the rental and 
the owned makes it more attractive to rent rather than own than ever before. On the other hand, 
the structure of the privately rented market has been changed over the past two decades. The 
typical landlord has treated buy-to-let as the mainstream for personal investment, and the tenants 
are now composited by far more immigrants and younger people. Consequently, although 
changes in rent may be less than the changes in market house price, they can easily exceed the 
changes in the fundamental house price in the UK, at least in the nominal term. 
Second, the significance tests reject the null hypothesis that changes in bubbles and lagged 
changes in bubbles are jointly insignificant, ܪ଴:ߚοభ௕೔,೟ = ߚοభ௕೔,೟షభ = 0, at the 1% significance 
level. Therefore, the changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ and the lagged changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ jointly 
cause the contemporaneous changes in house prices οଵ݌݄௜,௧, ceteris paribus. 
Third, throughout the paper, the FEMs use regional fixed effects which assume the potential 
omitted variable bias from variables that vary across regions but are constant over time. The 
paper does not exhibit the results of the fixed time effects, primarily because the results of fixed 
time effects are highly consistent with the results of FEM with regional fixed effects. 
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Furthermore, the paper does not present the fixed regional and time effect model, given that the 
paper’s dataset is not large enough to end up as a reasonable model fit. 
Fourth, the explanatory power of fundamental factors, in particular the changes in fundamental 
price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and the changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, on the changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ is 
quite low, as the ܴଶ is just 0.16 in Model 1. After incorporating the changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧, 
the ܴଶ dramatically increases to above 0.81 in Model 2, which indicates that the changes in 
bubbles can significantly explain the changes in house prices. The marginal effect of lagged 
changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧ିଵ and the interaction effects on changes in house price is quite low, as 
the marginal increase in ܴଶ is less than 0.05 in Models 2 through 5. 
Finally, the F-tests for the fixed effects are statistically significant in Models 2 through 5, which 
indicate that the FEMs are superior to the Pooled OLS in these four models. The Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) random effects test fails to reject the null hypothesis of variances across 
individuals as zero in Models 1 through 5. Therefore, the Pooled OLS outperforms REM in all 
five models. The Hausman test suggests that REM outperforms FEM in Model 1, as the 
Hausman test fails to reject that the null hypothesis of REM is preferred. However, the Hausman 
tests break down in the remaining four models, given the ߯ଶ < 0. This is because the model 
fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman Test. Consequently, 
Pooled OLS works best in Model 1. FEMs are superior to Pooled OLS and REM in Models 2 
through 5. 
For the five FEMs, the LM independence tests indicate that the residuals are serially correlated. 
The Pasaran Cross-Sectional (CD) tests suggest that the residuals are correlated across 
individuals, except for Model 3.  
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The heteroskedasticity tests reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Because the 
diagnostics tests suggest the FEMs violate two or three model assumptions, the findings of the 
FEMs in Table 2 might be either more or less biased. 
In order to avoid empirical biases and provide appropriate test of robustness, we implemented 
the Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) with AR(1), the Feasible Generalized Least Squares 
(FGLS) with heteroscedasticity (Table 3, Panel A) and the Fixed Effects Models with robust 
standard errors test proposed by White in 1980 (Table 3, Panel B). Both approaches in Table 3 
(Panel A) correct the panel residuals for group-wise heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous 
correlation, and serial correlation. PCSE is an alternative to FGLS. When AR(1) is not specified, 
PCSE produces OLS estimates of the coefficients, while the standard errors are estimated 
differently. When AR(1) is specified, PCSE estimates the coefficients by using the Prais-Winsten 
regression, which is conditional on the estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients. The FGLS 
estimation is conditional on the estimation of the residual covariance matrix and is conditional on 
any autocorrelation coefficients that are estimated. Either the PCSE or FGLS estimator is 
consistent when the conditional mean is properly specified. FGLS is more efficient than PCSE as 
long as the assumed covariance is correctly structured. After controlling for heteroscedasticity 
the findings of Fixed Effects Models with robust standard errors reported in Table 3 (Panel B) 
are consistent with the findings in Table 2 and Table 3 (Panel A). 
However, the full FGLS variance-covariance estimates might be biased when the applied dataset 
consists of 10-20 regions with 10-40 time periods. The datasets, especially the subsamples, used 
in this paper falls roughly into this category. PCSEs are helpful in precisely assessing the 
variance across regions, as they purport to create higher standard errors in an effort to generate 
more conservative results. 
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PCSE with AR(1) and FGLS with heteroskedasticity may provide a better statistical estimation, 
especially for the standard errors. However, they are unsuitable to control the omitted variable 
bias as FEM does. In general, the findings of Table 3 (Panel A and Panel B) are highly consistent 
with Table 2. Therefore, we can conclude that the economic implications of the Table 2 are 
sound and reliable. 
Table 4 investigates whether the changes in house prices οଵ݌݄௜,௧ cause changes in bubbles  οଵܾ௜,௧ in terms of fixed effects model with a robust standard error (White, 1980), and PCSE with 
AR(1). From Table 4, Model 1 regresses changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧  against changes in the 
fundamental price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧. The coefficients on changes in 
the fundamental price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  are significantly negative, with a value of -0.008 in FEM 
and -0.006 in PCSE with AR(1), respectively. The coefficients on changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ are 
significantly negative, with a value of -0.251 in FEM; but statistically insignificant in PCSE with 
AR(1). 
After controlling for changes in the fundamental price-rent ratio οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and changes in rent οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ , Model 2 suggests that the coefficients on the changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧  are 
significantly positive, with a value of 0.648 in FEM and 0.488 in PCSE with AR(1).  
Therefore, Model 2 of FEM suggests that one percent changes in house prices drive 0.65 percent 
changes in bubbles, ceteris paribus. 
Model 3 adds the lagged changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ିଵ as another independent variable. The 
coefficients on changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ are still significant and positive, ceteris paribus. 
The coefficients on lagged changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ିଵ are significantly positive, with a 
20 
 
value of approximately 0.2, which indicates that the one percent changes in house price will 
cause about a 20% subsequent change in bubbles, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the PCSE with 
AR(1) approach indicates the coefficient on changes in the fundamental price-rent ratios οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  
become significantly positive at the 5% significance level, implying that the changes in bubbles 
reflect people’s overreaction to changes in the fundamentals (Black et al., 2006).  
Model 4 and Model 5 include interaction variables, changes in house price and changes in the 
fundamental price-rent ratio οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙ , and changes in house price and changes in rent οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ . After controlling for the interaction variables, the coefficient on changes in 
house price remains significantly positive. The coefficients on οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  are insignificant. 
The coefficients on οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧ are significant and negative, while the figures of coefficients 
are quite small in both FEM and PCSE with AR(1). 
From Table 4, the causality test indicates that the changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ and lagged 
changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ିଵ are jointly significant in driving the changes in bubbles οଵܾ௜,௧. 
Overall, the findings of FEM are highly consistent with PCSE with AR(1), except for a few 
exceptions. 
Tables 2 through 4 suggest that there are statistically significant feedback effects between the 
changes in bubbles and the changes in contemporaneous house prices between 1996Q2 and 
2011Q1. However, the effect is asymmetric. After controlling for the fundamental variables, one 
percent changes in contemporaneous bubbles drives approximately one percent changes in house 
prices, given that the bubble is a component of house price. In particular, the coefficients on 
lagged changes in house price οଵ݌݄௜,௧ିଵ are significantly higher than those for the fundamentals 
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in terms of magnitude, thereby implying that past price dynamics are more important than 
contemporary fundamentals in driving the UK house price bubbles, which favours the irrational 
expectation hypothesis, at least in the short-run. 
 
4.2 Robustness Tests 
Following the modelling procedure in Table 2, Table 5 investigates whether the changes in 
bubbles cause the changes in house prices in terms of FEM with robust standard errors (White, 
1980) for the subsamples 1996Q2-2000Q4, 2001Q1-2006Q4 and 2007Q1-2011Q1. The three 
subsamples roughly match the recovery, boom, and recession of the UK housing market, 
respectively. 
The findings of Table 5 are highly consistent with Table 2. Broadly speaking, Table 2, Table 3 
and Table 5 exhibit parameter instability, which means that the coefficient on any given variable 
changes from model to model and over time. Moreover, the coefficients on the changes in rent 
and the interaction variables exhibit more changes than those for the reminder of the variables in 
terms of magnitude and sign. From an economics perspective, the time varying coefficients 
reflect the dynamics of the underlying economy and people’s economic behaviour (Brown et al., 
1997). Given that the sample size is relatively small, the changes in coefficients over time are 
quite modest, even in the presence of the Subprime Crisis between 2007 and 2009. 
Following Table 4, Table 6 studies whether the changes in house price cause the changes in 
bubble by using FEM with robust standard errors (White, 1980) for the subsamples 1996Q2-
2000Q4, 2001Q1-2006Q4 and 2007Q1-2011Q1. The general findings in Table 6 are highly 
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consistent with Table 4, except for the modest parameter instability. More detailed econometric 
results of Tables 5 and 6 are available upon request.  
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper considers whether the bounded rationality expectation hypothesis best fits the UK 
housing market in terms of panel data analysis. Furthermore, we investigate whether or not the 
feedback theory is supported in the UK housing market. 
We have found evidence to support the idea that the irrational expectation hypothesis best fits the 
UK housing market in the short-run. However, we failed to find support for the feedback theory 
because an increase in bubbles could cause a subsequent decrease in house prices, ceteris 
paribus. We observe that the statistically significant and positive feedback causal relationship 
between the changes in house price and the contemporaneous changes in bubbles are 
asymmetrical. One percent changes in bubbles could drive approximately one percent change in 
house prices after controlling for the fundamental variables. Therefore, it is the build-up of 
bubbles which is driving the changes in house prices over time. We have found weak evidence to 
support the bounded rational expectation hypothesis. The lagged changes in bubbles could cause 
significant subsequent changes in house prices in a reverse direction, which suggests that people 
learn from their past mistakes and try to adjust the house prices to converge to their fundamental 
value. However, the adjustment effect is not powerful enough to offset the negative effects of 
biased expectations in the current period, ceteris paribus. The changes in fundamental variables 
could significantly drive the changes in bubbles, thereby implying that the bubbles are not 
dominated by people’s purely irrational behaviour. These evidences jointly suggest that 
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fundamentals also play an important role in driving the UK housing prices and house price 
bubbles in the short-run. Moreover, the modest time varying coefficients for a given variable 
indicate that there are institutional changes which, in turn, suggest that people adjust their 
behaviours according to the dynamics of the underlying economy. There are several avenues for 
future research in this area. In another study we would like to explore whether the results of the 
UK housing market can be implemented in other developed housing markets such as the U.S. 
market or any developing country market. We think that the outcome of this particular study 
could be very useful for policy makers and the general public worldwide.
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Appendices 
Table A1 Preliminary Statistics (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of Obs. ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚  .016 .037 -.172 .157 60 ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  .007 .006 -.002 .029 60 ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   .004 .488 -2.647 2.011 60 ο૚࢈࢏,࢚  .010 .026 -.099 .114 60 
Notes: οଵ݌݄௜,௧ is the changes in house price index. οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧  is the changes in house rent index. οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  is 
the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio. οଵܾ௜,௧ is the changes in bubbles. 
Table A2 Correlation Matrix (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
 ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ  ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ି૚ ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ି૚ ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚  1.000      ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.024 1.000     ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.397 -.027 1.000    ο૚࢈࢏,࢚  .831 -.058 -.155 1.000   ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ି૚  .362 -.009 -.048 .596 1.000  ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ି૚  .544 .017 -.189 .784 .835 1.000 
Notes: οଵ݌݄௜,௧ is the changes in house price index. οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧  is the changes in house rent index. οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  is 
the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio. οଵܾ௜,௧ is the changes in bubbles. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Panel Data Unit Root Tests 
 ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ  ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚ ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ 
Harris–Tzavalis (HT) Test .000 .000 .000 .000 
Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) Test .000 .000 .000 .0053 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) Test .000 .000 .000 .0002 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. οଵ݌݄௜,௧ denotes for changes in house price index for region ݅ at time ݐ. οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  denotes for changes in fundamental house price-rent ratio for region ݅  at time ݐ . οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧  is 
changes in house rent index for region ݅ at time ݐ. οଵ ௜ܾ,௧ denotes for changes in bubbles for region ݅ at 
time ݐ. The figures presented in Table 1 are ݌-ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ݏ. 
 
26 
 
Table 2 Changes in Bubbles cause Changes in HPIs: Fixed Effects Models vs. Random Effects Models 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚  Fixed Effects Models (1996Q2-2011Q1) Random Effects Models (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.031*** (.003) -.020*** (.001) -.022*** (.001) -.026*** (.001) -.026*** (.001) -.031*** (.003) -.021*** (.001) -.023*** (.001) -.026*** (.002) -.026*** (.002) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.167 
(.201) 
.136 
(.094) 
.232** 
(.095) 
.232** 
(.093) 
.349*** 
(.102) 
-.167 
(.200) 
.115 
(.107) 
.224** 
(.108) 
.224** 
(.107) 
.397*** 
(.116) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚  
 
1.209*** 
(.024) 
1.538*** 
(.034) 
1.479*** 
(.035) 
1.557*** 
(.044) 
 
 
1.124*** 
(.026) 
1.500*** 
(.038) 
1.455*** 
(.040) 
1.571*** 
(.051) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ି૚  
  
-.434*** 
(.034) 
-.395*** 
(.034) 
-.414*** 
(.035) 
 
 
 
 
-.484*** 
(.039) 
-.456*** 
(.039) 
-.483*** 
(.040) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      .002*** (.0004) .002*** (.0004)    .001*** (.0004) .001*** (.0004) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  
    
-.104*** 
(.037)     
-.154*** 
(.042) 
Constant .017*** 
(.002) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.017*** 
(.002) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
Causality Test    .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No      
No. Observation 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 
Within ࡾ૛ .160 .818 .853 .858 .860 .160 .817 .851 .857 .858 
F-test for Fixed Effect .997 .000 .000 .000 .000      
LM Random Effect Test      1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hausman Test .999 ߯ଶ < 0  ߯ଶ < 0  ߯ଶ < 0  ߯ଶ < 0  .999 ߯ଶ < 0  ߯ଶ < 0  ߯ଶ < 0  ߯ଶ < 0  
LM Independence Test  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000      
Pasaran CD Test .000 .000 .374 .028 .004      
Heteroskedasticity Test .000 .000 .000 .000 .000      
Notes: The interaction variables, οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵ ௜ܾ,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying them by 100. ߯ଶ < 0 means the Hausman 
test fails as the model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions. The values presented for the diagnostics tests are ݌-ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ݏ. 
The null hypothesis of the Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௕೔,೟ = ߚοభ௕೔,೟షభ = 0. The null hypothesis of the LM Independence Test is the residuals across 
regions are not correlated. The null hypothesis of the Pasaran Cross-sectional Dependence (CD) Test is the residuals are not correlated across 
regions. The null hypothesis of Heteroskedasticity test is homoskedasticity. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 3 Changes in Bubble cause Changes in HPI (Panel A): PCSE with AR(1) vs. FGLS with Heteroskedasticity 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚  PCSE (AR1) (1996Q2-2011Q1) FGLS (Heteroskedasticity) (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.031*** (.002) -.023*** (.001) -.023*** (.001) -.027*** (.002) -.027*** (.002) -.029*** (.002) -.023*** (.001) -.026*** (.001) -.028*** (.001) -.028*** (.001) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.012 
(.244) 
.133 
(.119) 
.214* 
(.112) 
.218* 
(.115) 
.375*** 
(.132) 
-.198 
(.183) 
.068 
(.081) 
.111 
(.079) 
.101 
(.079) 
.291*** 
(.089) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚   1.159*** 
(.037) 
1.477*** 
(.042) 
1.409*** 
(.046) 
1.515*** 
(.056) 
 
 
1.081*** 
(.020) 
1.560*** 
(.031) 
1.550*** 
(.033) 
1.657*** 
(.040) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ି૚    
 
-.463*** 
(.042) 
-.418*** 
(.044) 
-.442*** 
(.044) 
 
 
 
 
-.516*** 
(.031) 
-.513*** 
(.033) 
-.541*** 
(.032) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      .002*** (.0004) .002*** (.0004)    .001*** (.0003) .001** (.0003) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚      -.142*** 
(.046) 
    -.138*** 
(.032) 
Constant .015*** 
(.005) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.017*** 
(.002) 
.002*** 
(.001) 
.002*** 
(.001) 
.002*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
No. Observation 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 ࡾ૛  .328 .737 .791 .793 .797      ࡼ࢘࢕࢈ > ࣑૛  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. The interaction variables, οଵ ௜ܾ,௧ כ οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵܾ௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying them by 100. The 
null hypothesis of the Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௕೔,೟ = ߚοభ௕೔,೟షభ = 0. ܲݎ݋ܾ > ߯ଶ tests for whether all of the coefficients in the model are jointly 
significant. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stands for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 Fixed Effects Models with robust standard errors (Panel B) 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚   Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) UK (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.031*** (.003) -.021*** (.004) -.023*** (.005) -.026*** (.005) -.026*** (.005) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.167 
(.139) 
0.115 
(.143) 
.224 
(.172) 
.224 
(.163) 
.397** 
(.150) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚   1.124*** 
(.093) 
1.50*** 
(.248) 
1.455*** 
(.231) 
1.571*** 
(.218) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ି૚    
 
-.484** 
(.191) 
-.456** 
(.177) 
-.483** 
(.171) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      .0015* (.001) .0013 (.001) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚      -.154*** 
(.036) 
Constant 0.017*** 
(.001) 
.004 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.0035* 
(.002) 
Regional Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No 
No. Observation 720 720 708 708 708 
Within ࡾ૛ .159 .779 .807 .811 .814 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. The White (1980) robust standard deviation controls for heteroskedasticity. The interaction variables, οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כοଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the diagnostics tests are p-values. The null hypothesis of 
Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟ = ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟షభ = 0. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stands for statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 4 Changes in HPI cause Changes in Bubble: Fixed Effects Models vs. PCSE (AR1) 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢈࢏,࢚  Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) (1996Q2-2011Q1) PCSE (AR1) (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.008*** (.003) .011*** (.003) .009*** (.002) .009*** (.002) .012*** (.002) -.006*** (.001) .009*** (.001) .008*** (.001) .008*** (.001) .011*** (.001) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.251** (.099) -.143 (.108) -.141 (.104) -.140 (.124) -.130 (.117) -.123 (.126) -.134 (.109) -.120** (.058) -.129** (.063) -.136** (.063) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚   .648*** (.074) .555*** (.064) .555*** (.056) .580*** (.057)   .488*** (.021) .507*** (.014) .504*** (.017) .531*** (.018) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ି૚    
 
.237*** 
(.013) 
.237*** 
(.013) 
.228*** 
(.014) 
 
 
 
 
.194*** 
(.012) 
.194*** 
(.012) 
.187*** 
(.012) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      -.001 (.024) -.005 (.021)    .005 (.018) .004 (.018) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚      -.001*** (.0002)     -.001*** (.0001) 
Constant .012*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
.009* 
(.005) 
.003** 
(.002) 
-.0003 
(.001) 
-.0003 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No      
No. Observation 720 720 708 708 708 720 720 708 708 708 
Within ࡾ૛ .029 .790 .889 .889 .893 .072 .615 .723 .725 .731 ࡼ࢘࢕࢈ > ࣑૛       .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. The Robust St. Dev. stands for White (1980) robust standard deviation which controls for heteroskedasticity. The 
interaction variables, οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כ οଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the diagnostics tests are ݌-ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ݏ. The null hypothesis of Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟ = ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟షభ = 0. ܲݎ݋ܾ > ߯ଶ tests for whether all the coefficients in the model are 
jointly significant. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stands for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 Changes in Bubble cause Changes in HPI (Panel A): Fixed Effects Models 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚  Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) UK (1996Q2-2000Q4) Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) UK (2001Q1-2006Q4) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.041*** (.003) -.031*** (.005) -.033*** (.005) -.036*** (.005) -.037*** (.005) -.018*** (.002) -.014***  (.003) -.018*** (.005) -.015** (.006) -.015** (.006) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  .070 (.077) .194* (.105) .266* (.143) .230 (.136) .353 (.212) -.629*** (.169) .189 (.128) .159 (.170) .152 (.170) .623*** (.174) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚   .941*** (.082) 1.087*** (.117) 1.063*** (.125) 1.203*** (.131)   1.263*** (.116) 1.592*** (.261) 1.610*** (.263) 1.742*** (.269) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ି૚    
 
-.325*** 
(.079) 
-.254** 
(.087) 
-.274*** 
(.080) 
 
 
 
 
-.490** 
(.218) 
-.504** 
(.220) 
-.519** 
(.219) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      .004*** (.001) .004** (.002)    -.0006 (.001) -.001 (.001) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚      -.162 (.146)     -.202*** (.058) 
Constant .015*** 
(.001) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.007*** 
(.001) 
.007*** 
(.001) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
.038*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.003) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No 
No. Observation 228 228 216 216 216 288 288 276 276 276 
Within ࡾ૛ .539 .794 .824 .834 .836 .107 .759 .806 .806 .814 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. The White (1980) robust standard deviation controls for heteroskedasticity. The interaction variables, οଵ ௜ܾ,௧ כοଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵ ௜ܾ,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying 100. The values presented for the diagnostics tests are ݌-ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ݏ. The null hypothesis 
of Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௕೔,೟ = ߚοభ௕೔,೟షభ = 0. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stands for statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 Changes in Bubble cause Changes in HPI (Panel B): Fixed Effects Models 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚   Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) UK (2007Q1-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.046*** (.007) -.027*** (.007)  -.027*** (.007) -.024*** (.006) -.024*** (.006) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.635* (.312) -.152 (.295) .347 (.269) .313 (.249) .359 (.347) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚   1.146*** (.105) 1.459*** (.264) 1.429*** (.259) 1.406*** (.278) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ି૚    
 
-.469** 
(.207) 
-.434* 
(.199) 
-.432** 
(.200) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      .004*** (.001) .004*** (.001) ο૚࢈࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚      .031 (.118) 
Constant -.007*** 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.002) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No 
No. Observation 204 204 192 192 192 
Within ࡾ૛ .346 .784 .821 .831 .832 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. The White (1980) robust standard deviation controls for heteroskedasticity. The interaction variables, οଵ ௜ܾ,௧ כοଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵ ௜ܾ,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying 100. The values presented for the diagnostics tests are ݌-ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ݏ. The null hypothesis 
of Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௕೔,೟ = ߚοభ௕೔,೟షభ = 0. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stands for statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Changes in HPI cause Changes in Bubble (Panel A): Fixed Effects Models 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢈࢏,࢚   Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) UK (1996Q2-2000Q4) Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) UK (2001Q1-2006Q4) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.010** (.004) .014*** (.003) .014*** (.002) .015*** (.002) .018*** (.002) -.003 (.002) .007** (.003) .008** (.003) .008** (.003) .014*** (.003) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.132 (.113) -.173 (.110) -.135 (.109) .007 (.124) -.059 (.136) -.648*** (.115) -.284*** (.082) -.212** (.091) -.324* (.169) -.290 (.173) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚   .586*** (.080) .623*** (.073) .713*** (.068) .698*** (.066)   .578*** (.083) .533*** (.059) .512*** (.060) .539*** (.060) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ି૚    
 
.203*** 
(.031) 
.193*** 
(.031) 
.196*** 
(.022) 
 
 
 
 
.230*** 
(.010) 
.231*** 
(.010) 
.220*** 
(.010) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      -.105** (.041) -.059 (.039)    .035 (.041) .022 (.042) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚      -.001*** (.0004)     -.001*** (.0003) 
Constant .010*** 
(.001) 
.002** 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
.029*** 
(.001) 
.007** 
(.003) 
.001 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
.0008 
(.002) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No 
No. Observation 228 228 216 216 216 288 288 276 276 276 
Within ࡾ૛ .112 .602 .734 .751 .777 .044 .742 .857 .858 .865 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. The White (1980) robust standard deviation controls for heteroskedasticity. The interaction variables, οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כοଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the diagnostics tests are ݌-ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ݏ. The null hypothesis of 
Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟ = ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟షభ = 0. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stands for statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Changes in HPI cause Changes in Bubble (Panel B): Fixed Effects Models 
Dependent Variable ο૚࢈࢏,࢚   Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) UK (2007Q1-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ   -.017*** (.004) .010*** (.004) .008*** (.002) .008*** (.002) .008*** (.002) ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚  -.422 (.332) -.050 (.228) -.181 (.184) -.186 (.198) -.155 (.182) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚   .585*** (.083) .528*** (.081) .530*** (.078) .542*** (.079) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ି૚    
 
.223*** 
(.012) 
.223*** 
(.013) 
.216*** 
(.013) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ כ ο૚࢖࢘࢏,࢚ࢌ      -.003 (.031) -.0001 (.033) ο૚࢖ࢎ࢏,࢚ כ ο૚ࢎ࢘࢏࢏,࢚      
 
-.0007** 
(.0003) 
Constant -.009*** 
(.002) 
-.005** 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No 
No. Obs 204 204 192 192 192 
Within ࡾ૛ .126 .712 .824 .824 .829 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000 
Notes: οଵ means first difference. The White (1980) robust standard deviation controls for heteroskedasticity. The interaction variables, οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כοଵ݌ݎ௜,௧௙  and οଵ݌݄௜,௧ כ οଵ݄ݎ݅௜,௧, are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the diagnostics tests are ݌-ݒ݈ܽݑ݁ݏ. The null hypothesis of 
Causality Test is ܪ଴:ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟ = ߚοభ௣௛೔,೟షభ = 0. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Changes in Regional House Price Bubble (dlbubble) vs. Regional House Price 
Index (dlhpi) 
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